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ABSTRACT 
 
The article reviews the line of franchising research known as managing a franchise system. The 
main research topics that can be found in this line of research are conflicts between franchisor 
and franchisee, the balance of power in the franchising system, and managing the franchisor-
franchisee relationship. The author reviews some of the existing literature related to managing 
franchising systems and provides a synthesis and some recommendations to develop better 
franchising systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he analysis of the operation of a franchise system has been approached, primarily from the branch of 
marketing known as distribution channels or marketing channels. In this regard, the franchise system 
is treated as a distribution channel, using the dimensions traditionally used in the literature on 
distribution channels - conflict, power, and relationship (Stern & El-Ansary, 1988). 
 
 Conflict is understood to be inherent in the franchise system (Spinelli & Birley, 1998). Despite the fact that 
the franchising contract aligns the objectives of franchisor and franchisee, each part also has their particular agenda. 
When the particular interests of franchisor and franchisee interfere, the situation derives in conflict. One of the 
sources of conflict most recurrently observed in franchised systems is the divergence of goals derived from the 
royalty system. As the royalties the franchisee pays to the franchisor are based on sales, not profits, the franchisor 
normally tries to increase the volume of the franchisee’s sales, whereas the franchisee may prefer to sell products 
that generate higher profit.  
 
 Spinelli and Birley (1998) illustrate that the franchisee’s perception of the franchisor’s level of cooperation, 
communication, coordination, and commitment can reduce the incongruence of their goals and the level of conflict. 
 
 Power is also a central dimension in the literature on franchising. The power asymmetry between the 
franchisor and the franchisee has been discussed with the objective of promoting and developing legislation to 
protect franchisees from abuses of power by the franchisor (Fern, 1995). The franchisee’s dependence on the 
franchisor confers upon the latter a source of power to control the franchisee and obtain his or her cooperation. Hunt 
and Nevin (1974) point out that the franchisee’s cooperation can be achieved in three ways: (1) persuading the 
franchisee of the value of their relationship with the franchisor, (2) using coercive power to manipulate the 
franchisee’s actions, or (3) using noncoercive means, such as franchisor support. 
 
 Franchisees are more willing to cooperate when they perceive themselves as forming part of the system’s 
decision-making structure and when the uncertainty over the outcome of their business is reduced by the 
franchisor’s support (Guiltinan, Rejab, & Rodgers, 1980). Schul, Pride, and Little (1983), however, find that 
franchisors that use an executive leadership style are more effective than the ones that use a participative leadership 
style when it comes to reducing conflict and increasing cooperation.  
 
 From a more “relational” point of view, Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin (1995) explain how the ability of the 
franchisor to maintain good relationships with the franchisees over the long term has a fundamental influence on the 
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success of the system. These authors maintain that solidarity is the behavioral norm, which maintains the cohesion 
between the franchisee and franchisor, and the degree of solidarity is determined by the psychological climate 
between the franchisee and the franchisor (depending on the perceptions of justice, cohesion, innovation, and 
autonomy). Anderson and Weitz (1989) point to the importance of communication and trust in order to create 
interpersonal relationships between the parties that form the basis of a stable long-term relationship between the 
franchisor and the franchisee.  
 
 Despite the importance of the relationship in a system, such as franchising, where contracts are, by 
definition, incomplete, there has been little empirical research seeking to link the quality of the franchisee–
franchisor relationship with the performance of the system. The work of Morrison (1997) studies the relationship 
between franchisee satisfaction and performance measured in terms of economic results, organizational 
commitment, relationships with the franchisor, and intention to remain in the system. Surprisingly, the results show 
a very weak (and moreover, negative) relationship between the franchisee–franchisor relationship and economic 
performance, although the methodology used does not allow causality to be established. Wood and Kiecker (1995) 
analyze the influence of the franchisee–franchisor relationship on performance from a theoretical point of view. 
Although they do not test their propositions empirically, they link the management style of the franchisor, the 
franchisee–franchisor relationship, and the franchisee–customer relationship with the performance of the system as a 
whole.  
 
 Strutton et al. (1995) indicate that the ability of the franchisor to maintain good relationships with its 
franchisees over the long term has an important influence on the success of the system. Madhok and Tallman (1998) 
contend that developing a quality relationship between the parties is not only important for the survival of the 
system but also is a difficult asset to copy, as well as an intrinsic source of value for the organization. Therefore, it 
seems to be a consensus among researchers about the importance of the relationships between franchisor and 
franchisee. The development of a good relationship between franchisee and franchisor is not only important, but it is 
a strategic capability for the success of the franchise system. 
 
 Following Kaufmann and Dant (1992), the quality of the relationship between the franchisee and the 
franchisor can be defined through four key dimensions: (1) long-term focus on the relationship, (2) appropriate use 
of power, (3) flexibility in the relationship, and (4) mutuality in the relationship. The first dimension - long-term 
focus - measures the degree to which the relationship between the franchisee and the franchisor is perceived by the 
parties as something more important than individual transactions. The second dimension - appropriate use of power - 
implies that, despite the fact that the contract establishes the power that legitimately corresponds to each part in a 
relational structure of governance, the parties will voluntarily limit the use of their power in order to preserve the 
relationship. The third dimension - flexibility, implies adaptation to change. Thus, when changes take place in the 
environment, both parties must adapt their behaviors to the new circumstances in order to preserve the relationship, 
despite the contractual provisions. The fourth dimension – mutuality - reflects the expectations both parties have in 
terms of the reciprocity of their exchanges over the long term. For example, in transactional governance systems, the 
parties require a positive balance from each individual transaction, considering each transaction as if it were the last. 
On the other hand, in relational systems, the parties expect a positive balance to emerge from the relationship over 
the long term. 
 
 A good relationship between franchisor and franchisee not only reduces opportunistic behaviors - and 
therefore the need for controls and safeguards - but also offers an opportunity for obtaining greater profitability 
through a more effective combination of the resources contributed by the franchisee and the franchisor. We have 
found that numerous franchise chains were more willing to invest in tangible assets (such as new premises and 
equipment), where calculating cost–benefit ratios is straightforward, than in intangible assets (such as the 
franchisee–franchisor relationship), where the cost–benefit ratio is much harder to determine. We believe that this is 
a short-term view, and our recommendation is that chains should invest resources in building solid relationships with 
their franchisees. Although the process of building a relationship of this kind is slow and will probably take time to 
bear fruit, the long-term benefits should more than outweigh the costs incurred. 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – July 2013   Volume 11, Number 7 
2013 The Clute Institute  Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 295 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this article we have reviewed the line of research known as managing a franchise system. Within this line 
of investigation, there are some very interesting questions, such as how to deal with the inevitable conflicts that arise 
in a franchising relationship and what is the best leadership style in a franchising organization - executive leadership 
style or participative leadership style. Another issue that seems to have a clear influence on the performance of a 
franchised chain is the relationship between franchisor and franchisee. The question here is how to build a good 
relationship between franchisor and franchisee, and the answer can be summarized in four final recommendations 
for the franchisor - adopt a long-term approach to the relationship, use power appropriately, be flexible in the 
relationship with the franchisee, and show reciprocity and mutuality in franchisor–franchisee exchanges. 
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